Eldon E. Rasmussen v. United States Steel Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1980
Eldon E. Rasmussen v. United States Steel
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dan S. Bushnell; Attorney for Respondent.
C. C. Parsons; A. D. Moffat; Calvin A. Behle; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Rasmussen v. United States Steel Company, No. 8081.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/433
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NT 
NO..10JIA . — 
m THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON E. RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
— vs.— 
UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D.MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
niBTED II U. S. A.-J0E R. BMWN PTG. CO., SAIT UKE CITV 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
INTRODUCTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1-3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 3-4 
ARGUMENT: 
Point I: 
There is no competent evidence that plaintiff and 
defendant's predecessor entered into an implied 
contract to pay retrocatively to its general office 
employees including plantiff, such salary differen-
tial as might be determined by the Company's own 
job evaluation, regardless of whether or not an 
employee should be on the payroll at the time such 
retroactive pay, if any, should be determined and 
ordered paid by the Company 4-15 
Point II: 
The court erred in admitting evidence of acts by 
the Company subsequent to November, 1950, by 
which time plaintiff's employment had ceased . . . . 15-17 
Point III: 
The court erred by its instruction No. 10 in per-
mitting the jury to consider evidence of acts of the 
employer subsequent to November, 1950, by which 
time plaintiff's employment had ceased 15-17 
CONCLUSION 17-19 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I N D E X (Continued) 
CITATIONS 
Page 
Restatement of Agency, § 12, 
Cited 18 
Restatement of Contracts: 
§ 1, cited 17 
§ 5, cited and quoted 11 
§ 5, cited 18 
§32, cited and quoted 12 
§32, cited 18 
28 A.L.R. 346, 
Cited 14 
Model Code of Evidence, Rules 1 and 9, 
Cited 18 
Haag v. Rogers (1911) (Ga.), 72 S,E. 46, 
Cited 14 
Pyeatt v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 213 P.2d 436, 
Cited 15 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELDON E. BASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
— vs.— 
UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8081' 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant appeals from judgment entered below on 
the jury's verdict that defendant was indebted to plain-
tiff in a stipulated sum under an implied contract for 
additional compensation for services, over and above 
the compensation for such services at the rate established 
by the express contract of employment between the em-
ployer and plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Eldon E. Rasmussen was hired by defend-
ant's predecessor, Geneva Steel Company, on January 
20,1947. (R. 136) On November 16,1950 he presented his 
written resignation (Ex. D-17) effective at the end of that 
month. (E.141) 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Easmussen was employed in the Company's general 
offices, a unit or place of employment separate and apart 
from the operating plants, mines and quarries of the 
Company wherein employees are generally represented 
for collective bargaining purposes by various labor or-
ganizations; these agents of course determine the rates 
of compensation and other working conditions for the 
employees of their bargaining units by express contracts 
with the employer. (E. 78) In contrast, the basic express 
contract of employment in plaintiff's case was strictly 
a bilateral agreement between employer and this employ-
ee ; and all compensation under this express contract was 
long since paid in due course for services performed be-
tween January 20,1947 and November 30,1950, inclusive. 
(E. 139) From 275 to 300 employees were so employed 
in the general offices, in contrast to some four to five 
thousand in the plants. (E. 156) 
Beginning in 1944 by agreement with the C.I.O. the 
various subsidiaries of United States Steel began an "in-
equities" job evaluation program. (E. 64) In the case of 
employees represented by the various unions, the union 
contracts were specific as to the conduct of the job evalu-
ation program, and set definite cut-off dates by which 
time an employee must apply in writing for retroactive 
pay; such pay would then become due under such appli-
cation if determined to be due under the job evaluation 
program, whether or not the particular employee happen-
ed to be on the payroll at the effective date of the plan. 
(E. 70) The Company on its own initiative subsequent 
to the completion of the job evaluation for the union 
employees, likewise so provided in the case of all salaried 
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plant employees, whether or not covered by union con-
tracts. (E. 71) 
Plaintiff was employed in the Engineering Depart-
ment of the general office as a power and fuel engineer. 
(K. 71) In the fall of 1950 Geneva Steel Company began 
a job evaluation program for its general office employ-
ees. (E. 68) It was under no obligation to do so, under-
taking the project on its own initiative. (E. 78,110) This 
evaluation was not completed until 1951, when its details 
were announced and it was made effective June 3rd of 
that year. (E, 69) 
It will be recalled that plaintiff had resigned, effec-
tive December 1, 1950. (Ex. D-17, E. 141) 
As to general office employees, the Company took 
the position that they must be on the payroll at the 
effective date of the evaluation plan in order to receive 
any retroactive pay attributable to a particular job. (E. 
72) Accordingly, the increases applicable to the job held 
by plaintiff were not paid plaintiff, who made demand 
therefor in May of 1951. (E, 138) Eefusal led to this 
lawsuit, complaint being filed July 28, 1952. (E. 1) 
Judgment based upon the jury's verdict for the 
established amount due, if any, was entered June 2, 
1953. (E. 210) This appeal was taken by defendant on 
July 23, 1953 from the money judgment (E. 220), motion 
for new trial having been denied June 26, 1953 (E. 221) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
There is no competent evidence that plaintiff and 
defendant's predecessor entered into an implied contract to 
3 
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pay retroactively to its general office employees including 
plaintiff, such salary differential as might be determined by 
the Company's own job evaluation, regardless of whether 
or not an employee should be on the payroll at the time such 
retroactive pay, if any, should be determined and ordered 
paid by the Company. 
II. 
The court erred in admitting evidence of acts by the 
Company subsequent to November, 1950, by which time 
plaintiff's employment had ceased. 
III. 
The court erred by its instruction No. 10 in permitting 
the jury to consider evidence of acts of the employer subse-
quent to November, 1950, by which time plaintiff's employ-
ment had ceased. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
There is no competent evidence that plaintiff and 
defendant's predecessor entered into an implied contract to 
pay retroactively to its general office employees including 
plaintiff, such salary differential as might be determined by 
the Company's own job evaluation, regardless of whether 
or not an employee should be on the payroll at the time such 
retroactive pay, if any, should be determined and ordered 
paid by the Company. 
Plaintiff sought to establish his implied contract 
upon which the judgment is based on the following evi-
dence most favorable to plaintiff: 
a. Testimony that it had been the "custom" or 
"policy" of the Company on two occasions to grant to 
non-union employees general increases, such as cost-of-
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living increases, at about the same time and comparable 
in amount as those granted to its union employees; this 
not as an obligation, but in order not to leave any group 
of employees out and to treat all fairly. An example was 
the testimony of James L. Dillon, former Superintend-
ent of Industrial Eelations of the employer. (E. 61, 80, 82) 
b. In addition plaintiff was permitted over objec-
tion to introduce a series of exhibits constituting various 
news releases and general announcements discussing in 
general terms the job evaluation program. (Exhibits P- l 
to 8, inclusive.) I t is submitted that none of these are 
specific or refer to the general office employees. 
c. Plaintiff then established that before he had 
resigned he had prepared a job description of his posi-
tion in October. (Ex. P-9, E. 142) Also the obvious fact 
that the employees knew an evaluation program was 
under way for the general offices. (E. 77) But it was 
perfectly clear that the employees did not know whether 
or not there would be an effective program at all adopted 
by the Company until the announcement of December 15, 
1950 (Ex. D-15, D-16) And the details of the program 
and the conditions whereunder it was to be applicable to 
the particular employee were not established until June 
1, 1951, effective June 3rd of that year. (Ex. P-12) 
For example, Witness Sumsion for plaintiff testified 
(R.133) : 
Q. And did you think those in the plant, that 
they had a reclassification program that per-
mitted, in some instances, men who no longer 
were on the payroll at the time to get their 
5 
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retroactive pay, did you think because of that 
you would be entitled to that in the general 
office? 
A. Let me say, I sincerely hoped so. I could not 
positively say, but we all felt that way. 
Q. Of couse you hoped so, but you didn't know 
what the company would do, did you? 
A. They stated in one bulletin there was a pro-
gram under way that would include us. 
Q. Now we are talking about these retroactive 
payments, you didn't know what the company 
would do, in respect to the program for the 
general offices with relation to retroactive 
pay, did you? 
A. Well one could never be sure until he was 
actually,—until he had received the pay, I 
suppose, but we knew the program was under 
way, and we all felt we would be included. 
Q. The program was under way, but you didn't 
know what turns it would take, did you? 
A. I don't follow you exactly. 
Q. On what terms the retroactive payments 
would be made, you didn't know, did you? 
A. Well, we knew they would be made, they 
would be paid on the basis of our job des-
criptions, the work we were doing. 
Q. But whether a man was on the payroll or not, 
you didn't know whether it would have an 
effect one way or the other? 
A. No sir. 
Q. You didn't know anything about that? 
A. No. 
6 
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Q. You say "no"? 
A. No. 
Q. In the nature of things, you couldn't know 
anything about it could you? 
A. No sir. 
Q. You got your retroactive pay? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You were on the payroll when you got it, 
weren't you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. In other words, you hoped you would get it 
when the program was in progress, that is all 
you knew about it, isn't it? 
A. Actually it probably boiled down to a hope; 
coupled with the fact that we all felt we would 
get in and the fact that we felt we had it 
coming. 
Plaintiff himself testified on direct examination (R. 
Q. Did you know about the job classification pro-
gram that took effect in connection with 
salaried employees in the plant? 
A. Yes sir, I did. 
Q. Were you ever advised by the company prior 
to the time you left the company, if you 
expected to get your retroactive pay you 
would have to be on the payroll on the effec-
tive date? 
A. No sir. 
7 
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Q. When you anticipated leaving the company, 
was anything said by anyone with reference 
to retroactive pay! 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Will you state by whom, when and where, and 
who was present? 
A. After I had submitted my resignation and 
was preparing to leave, my superior, Mr. 
Gaw, called me in and he told me at that time 
that he did not know what effect the inequity 
program would take as to my case, but I think 
at that time he was trying to give me some 
reasons to stay on in the employ of the com-
pany. 
Also (B. 138-9): 
Q. (by Mr. Bushnell) From your testimony, you 
learned a letter came out December 15th, that 
is after you left? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you speak to anyone, was anything else 
done with regard to retroactive pay? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What was that? 
A. When I checked with the payroll department 
clerk, that checked me out, took my address 
and told me it was for the purpose if retro-
active pay was ever made they would know 
where to get in touch with me and where to 
pay. 
Q. Did you contact the company at any other 
time with reference to retroactive pay? 
A. Yes. I did. 
8 
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Q. When was that? 
A. In May 1951,1 believe. 
Q. Where did you go to see about it at that time ? 
A. I stopped in Mr. Jones office, I went there 
for the express purpose of submitting my 
application for retroactive pay. 
Q. Were you permitted to talk to Mr. Dillon! 
A. No. 
Q. Who did you talk to? 
A. A girl in charge of his office. 
Q. Tell what happened? 
A. She took the information down, went in Mr. 
Dillon's office, I suppose she discussed the 
problem with Mr. Dillon, and came back. 
ME. PARSONS: What he supposed is not rele-
vant. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BUSHNELL: Strike it. 
Q. (by Mr. Bushnell) What did she say when 
you came back? 
A. She said I was not elegible and did not need 
to submit the application. 
Q. This is two or three months after you quit? 
A. Yes sir. 
MR. BUSHNELL: You may cross examine. 
And on cross examination (R. 139): 
9 
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Q. No one in authority ever told you you were 
going to get your retroactive pay, and your 
name was not on the payroll at the time the 
plan became effective, did they? 
A. No sir, no one told me I wouldn't either. 
Q. You were paid the full amount that you were 
entitled to so far as any wages were con-
cerned, were you not? 
A. Well at the rate I was receiving at that time, 
in anticipation of inequity, I would say I was 
paid at the rate that was paid for the job at 
our particular plant for the particular job 
at that particular time. 
Of course, we always anticipated the fact 
we might get inequity, and it would cover the 
same period covered for hourly workers, with 
which I was familiar. 
Q. You hoped you would? 
A. I thought I would, yes, because it was the 
custom of the company to always treat their 
salaried employees as good, if not better. 
Q. Aside from that, when you left, you had been 
paid in full, hadn't you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Finally, on page 141 of the record: 
Q. (by Mr. Parsons) You have used the word 
"custom" or "practice" what do you mean by 
those words? 
A. Well, where ever benefits were given to one 
group of employees, such as those covered by 
the bargaining units of which there are two 
groups, the company has always, as far as I 
know, came — gave similar benefits to the 
10 
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salaried employees, at least of the non-exempt 
salaried employees of which I was one. 
Q. Really that is the sum and substance of your 
position, isn't it? 
A. Well, I believe it is. 
MR. PARSONS: That is all. 
(1) In the first place, this evidence, selected as that 
most favorable to plaintiff, would appear to fall far 
short of that required to establish mutual assent to the 
promises of a contract. As set forth in Section 5 of the 
Restatement of Contracts, "a promise in a contract must 
be stated in such words either oral or written, or must 
be inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as justi-
fies the promisee in understanding that the promisor 
intended to make a promise". 
The familiar illustrations of promises so implied are 
given as follows: 
1. A telephones to his grocer, "Send me a 
barrel of flour." The grocer sends i t A has 
thereby contracted to pay a reasonable price 
therefor. 
2. A, on passing a market, where he has an 
account, sees a box of apples marked "5 cts. each." 
A picks up an apple, holds it up so that a clerk 
of the establishment sees the act. The clerk nods, 
and A passes on. A has contracted to pay five 
cents for the apple. 
(2) Secondly, the requirement of certainty is not 
met. Section 32 of the Restatement sets forth this 
requirement in the following language: 
11 
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§ 32. REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY IN 
THE TERMS OF AN OFFER. 
An offer must be so definite in its terms, or 
require such definite terms in the acceptance, that 
the promises and performances to be rendered by 
each party are reasonably certain. 
Comment: 
a. Inasmuch as the law of contracts deals only 
with duties defined by the expressions of the 
parties, the rule stated in the Section is one of 
necessity as well as of law. The law cannot sub-
ject a person to a contractual duty or give an-
other a contractual right unless the character 
thereof is fixed by the agreement of the parties. 
A statement by A that he will pay B what A 
chooses is no promise. A promise by A to give 
B employment is not wholly illusory, but if neither 
the character of the employment nor the compen-
sation therefor is stated, the promise is so indefi-
nite that the law cannot enforce it, even if con-
sideration is given for it. 
b. Promises may be indefinite in time or in 
place, or in the work or things to be given in 
exchange for the promise. In dealing with such 
cases the law endeavors to give a sufficiently clear 
meaning to offers and promises where the parties 
intended to enter into a bargain, but in some 
cases this is impossible. 
c. Offers which are originally too indefinite 
may later acquire precision and become valid 
offers, by the subsequent words or acts of the 
offeror or his assent to words or acts of the of-
feree. 
With respect to comment "c", such occurrences in 
this case did not take place until after plaintiff had 
resigned, supra. 
12 
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An apt illustration is cited from page 42, under this 
section : 
6. A promises B to sell to him and B prom-
ises A to buy of him goods "at cost plus a nice 
profit/' The promise is too indefinite to form a 
contract. 
Construing the evidence in this ease most favorably 
for plaintiff, Geneva at best promised to pay Easmussen 
X dollars per month. True, there was a hope for more; 
more had been granted other groups. But as to the gen-
eral office employees, including plaintiff, no one in au-
thority had ever announced during plaintiff's period of 
employment whether or not such a retroactive pay plan 
would ever be adopted, or if so, on what conditions, supra. 
This announcement did not come until December 15, 
1950 and later; and by then plaintiff was no longer an 
employee so could not assent to such a promise or extend 
any consideration therefor. 
Not only was the $64 question unannounced — if 
there would be a plan at all; but such details as the 
retroactive date, the amounts, the cut-off dates, the 
effective dates, and who should be qualified under the 
plan — all were as wide open as the sky. Not until 
December 15,1950 — fifteen days after the effective date 
of plaintiff's voluntary resignation — did the President 
of the Company announce through Exhibits D-15 and 
D-16 that there would be any plan at all for the general 
office employees. This first official announcement was 
made in these words: 
SUBJECT: Salary Adjustment for Nonexempt 
13 
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Salaried Employees (Except those Employed 
within the Geneva and Ironton Plants) 
Effective December 1, 1950, the nonexempt 
salaried employees within your department re-
ceive an increase of $22 per month. 
A program for the description, job classifi-
cation, and establishment of a standard salary 
scale for nonexempt salaried jobs (except those 
within the Geneva and Ironton Plants, where a 
like program has been completed) is presently 
under way and will be completed as soon as pos-
sible. Upon completion of the program, any 
adjustment in salary resulting therefrom will be 
adjusted from March 9, 1947 forward for all non-
exempt salaried employees who are on the payroll 
the date the standard salary scale is made effec-
tive. 
Will you please advise nonexempt salaried 
personnel within your department, whose salary 
rates will be adjusted as shown above. 
Not until the following June were the details per-
fected and the plan announced as effective June 3, 1951 
(Ex. P-12); but by then plaintiff was long since gone 
by his own choice. 
(3) Finally, this situation is not unlike the "bonus" 
situations concerning which some comparable cases have 
been decided by courts of sister jurisdictions. These are 
annotated in 28 A.L.E. 346; and such cases as Haag v. 
Eogers, (1911) (Ga.) 72 S.E. 46, makes it clear that 
voluntary termination of employment before the time 
specified in the employer's offer results in forfeiture of 
the bonus or retroactive pay because of failure of per-
formance on the part of the employee. 
14 
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Reference is also made to the case of Pyeatt v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co. (N. Mex. 1950), 213 P. 2d 436. 
There the court denied recovery to employees who had 
quit before the effective date of a retroactive wage 
increase. The employer had announced his intention of 
seeking War Labor Board approval of such a plan; but 
the Board then disapproved the proposals, following 
which the employees voluntarily terminated their serv-
ices. Subsequently the Board modified its position and 
a plan was made effective, but not as to plaintiffs. The 
court there referred to the bonus case rule, affirming the 
employer's position, stating that if the employee 'Volun-
tarily terminates his services before the bonus is payable 
he is not entitled to it." 
A fortiori here, where plaintiff quit work voluntarily 
before any offer at all had as yet been made by Geneva. 
The court below accordingly erred when it denied 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict (R. 147); and 
failed to grant judgment for defendant notwithstanding 
the verdict. (R. 221) 
II. 
The court erred in admitting evidence of acts by the 
Company subsequent to November, 1950, by which time 
plaintiff's employment had ceased. 
III. 
The court erred by its instruction No. 10 in permitting 
the jury to consider evidence of acts of the employer subse-
quent to November, 1950, by which time plaintiff's employ-
ment had ceased. 
15 
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These two points are argued together, since the net 
result was to place before the jury for consideration 
evidence not applicable to plaintiff's contract of employ-
ment — whatever it was — since he had quit. 
As pointed out above, plaintiff voluntarily termi-
nated his employment effective at the end of November, 
1950, at which time no offer of retroactive pay had been 
made; it was then not known if there would be a plan 
for the general office employees at all, or the terms 
thereof if such a plan wlere to be effected. 
The court below had correctly ruled on several occa-
sions (e.g., R. 5) and in his other instructions that the 
employment contract was to be determined from facts 
and circumstances during the period of plaintiff's serv-
ice, i.e., from January 20, 1947 to December 1, 1950. 
(R. 199, 200) Then, on the theory that such evidence 
might indicate "if the defendant company intended to 
follow the usual practice and procedure, if any, with 
reference to salaries paid to different groups of 
employees of the defendant company" (R, 201), the court 
proceeded to admit evidence of acts and statements of 
the Company done or made after December 1, 1950; and 
by its instruction No. 10 permitted the jury to consider 
such evidence for the purpose quoted above. 
This evidence consisted of such items as the news 
release of the retroactive pay plan as finally announced 
affecting the general office employees (Ex. P-7) ; a let-
ter of April 2,1951 to the Government requesting author-
ity to adopt such a plan (Ex. P-8) ; the job description 
(Ex. P-9) and job classification (Ex. P-10) adopted for 
16 
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the position which plaintiff had formerly held; a tenta-
tive study as to Rasinussen upon which the amount due, 
if any, was stipulated (Ex. P - l l ) ; the plan as finally 
promulgated by the employer June 1, 1951 (Ex. P-12); 
and a somewhat comparable plan of another subsidiary, 
the United States Steel Corporation of Delaware (Ex. 
P-13). 
A great variety of oral testimony was required to 
identify and explain these various exhibits, including 
that of Dillon (R. 84-88); Friedley (R, 88-93-5); and 
Heald (R. 57). Much of this testimony involved argu-
ment and explanation as to the exact background, con-
struction and meaning of Exhibit 12 — the announcement 
of the plan effective June 3, 1951, including its effect on 
pregnant women (R. 157), although plaintiff had long 
before departed at the end of November, 1950 (R. 41). 
All of this redundant and irrelevant material could 
not help but prejudice the jury, which under the con-
fusion compounded reacted about as might have been 
expected. For this reason alone the judgment should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal really involves nothing more than an 
elementary review of some fundamentals of the law of 
contracts, agency and evidence, and the application of 
these hornbook rules to the facts of this case : 
1. A contract is a promise or set of promises 
(Restatement of Contracts, §1) which must be stated 
in such words either oral or written, or must be inferred 
17 
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wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies the 
promisee in understanding that the promisor intended to 
make a promise (Restatement, §5), and must be so 
definite in its terms that the promises and performances 
to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain 
(Restatement, §32). 
2. Evidence must be relevant and material (Model 
Code of Evidence, Rules 1 and 9). In the absence of 
such evidence to support the necessary elements of plain-
tiff's case, of course there can be no recovery. 
3. To bind the corporate employer, the promise 
must be made by agents acting within the scope of their 
authority (Restatement of Agency, §12). 
4. Plaintiff's case requires competent proof that 
defendant's predecessor promised him as a consideration 
for his services that in addition to the expaw* rate of 
pay, he would be given retroactive pay under a job 
evaluation program, whether or not plaintiff was still 
employed at the time such plan was to be made effective. 
Search as we must throughout the record — includ-
ing the 50-page Exhibit 14, and selecting and construing 
as again we must, all that is most favorable to plaintiff, 
we respectfully submit that nothing of substance can be 
discovered other than, in the words of plaintiff himself 
(R. 139), an anticipation or hope that such a result as 
he now claims might eventually be effected by the 
employer. But necessarily — since such a promise was 
never made, but in fact was denied during the employ-
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ment period (R. 139), such hope or anticipation would 
come, if ever, as a matter of grace; and not pursuant to 
a contractual right enforceable at law. 
To illustrate the remaining two points on this appeal, 
we ask the court to review briefly Exhibit P-14? the 
"United States Steel News" of July, 1950. On page 33 
will be found an article about the performance of a con-
tract between the C.I.O. and various companies other 
than Geneva Steel. Admittedly if plaintiff had read this 
article, he might well have entertained some hope, as 
have members of the Utah Judiciary over the years, for 
ultimate salary increases. 
As applied to this case, we respectfully submit that 
the only relevant portion of Exhibit 14 would be the 
article on page 41 on Mrs. Geneva Steele with its heading 
"Confusion, Confusion and More Confusion." 
There was not only the absence of competent proof 
in this case to support a promise by the employer; but 
such a wealth of immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent 
exhibits and testimony that it could not escape confusing 
the jury to the prejudice of defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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